Content Determination Is the Faithfulness Bottleneck: A Computable-Oracle Benchmark for Faithful LLM Explanations of Guardrail Decisions

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Abstract

When an AI agent's tool call is allowed or blocked by a policy gateway, an LLM typically generates the natural-language explanation shown to users and auditors. We study this as a data-to-text generation task with an unusual property. The input includes an executable decision function, so the correct content of the explanation (the minimal sufficient reason for the decision) is exactly computable. This yields a reference-free, fully automatic evaluation of content selection in generated explanations, via causal precision (is cited content actually part of a true reason?) and causal recall (is some complete reason covered?). Across four LLMs, end-to-end generation produces fluent explanations whose selected content rarely contradicts the input record yet is nonetheless about half irrelevant, at every model scale we test. The failure is content selection, not surface realization. Constraining length does not fix it. Under a one-sentence budget, models keep distractors and drop true reasons. Separating content determination from surface realization (an oracle selects content, the LLM only realizes it) restores near-perfect content precision and recall at equal fluency, and the guarantee survives audience adaptation into end-user and executive registers at a small realization cost. We release the benchmark, oracle, and evaluation suite.

1 Introduction

A growing class of NLG systems explains decisions made by executable, rule-governed processes such as benefit-eligibility and credit systems, content-moderation rule layers, compliance and configuration checkers, and (our running case) policy gateways that allow or block AI agents' tool calls (Inan et al., 2023; Anthropic, 2024; Yao et al., 2023; Rebedea et al., 2023; Markov et al., 2023). Regulation increasingly requires that such decisions be accompanied by meaningful information about the logic involved (Wachter et al., 2017; Goodman and Flaxman, 2017), and in practice that information is delivered as generated text. Structurally this is data-to-text generation (Reiter and Dale, 2000; Gatt and Krahmer, 2018). The input is a structured record (the decision context and the outcome), the output a short text for an audit log or an end user. But it poses the faithfulness question in an unusually sharp form. Faithfulness in NLG is not one property, and evaluations target several distinct criteria (Belz et al., 2025), among them consistency with the input record and the absence of unsupported additions (Maynez et al., 2020), and, separately, factual truth judged against a system-external reference (Thomson and Reiter, 2020). Decision explanation needs a further criterion. An output can be perfectly grounded (every statement true of the input record) and still deeply unfaithful, because it presents the wrong subset of the record as the reason for the decision. Throughout, we use faithfulness in this last sense, meaning that the content an explanation selects and presents as the reason is causally correct. Faithfulness errors can enter at any pipeline stage (Reiter and Dale, 2000; Reiter, 2007), and some departure from the literal input is unavoidable (van Deemter and Reiter, 2018), but in this setting the dominant burden falls on content determination, the stage that decides what to say.

Measuring this has been out of reach. Content-selection metrics in data-to-text compare against reference texts or the input record (Dhingra et al., 2019). Explanation-faithfulness proxies from the interpretability literature test consistency with a model's behavior (Atanasova et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2024). Neither can say whether a cited factor actually determined the decision, because for an opaque decision-maker the true reason is unknowable.

We observe that policy-gated agent systems make the true reason knowable. The decision-maker is a white-box executable policy over a struc-

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tured context. For such a function, the minimal sufficient reasons for any decision are exactly computable by counterfactual execution (Shih et al., 2018; Ignatiev et al., 2019). This turns content-selection evaluation for explanation generation into an exact, automatic computation with no references, no annotation, and no judge models grading text against text.

We make four contributions.

1. A task and testbed. GLASSGATE frames policy-decision explanation as data-to-text over a fully enumerable context space (124,416 contexts) gated by an executable policy, with 120 stratified episodes and exact oracle annotations (minimal sufficient reasons, decisive features, distractors) for every decision (§4).

2. An evaluation method. Reference-free content-selection metrics for generated explanations (causal precision, causal recall, oracle-checked sufficiency, over-claim rate) all computed by executing the gate, plus an audited extraction step mapping free text to cited content (§3). Because the testbed has exact ground truth, it doubles as a validation target. A cheaper faithfulness metric that cannot recover the truth here should not be trusted where no truth is available.

3. A diagnosis. Across four LLMs from a 14B on-device model to a frontier model, end-to-end generation selects content at ≈ 0.5 precision (half of every explanation's cited reasons are causally irrelevant) while fluency is high, over-claiming is rare, and recall is decent. The bottleneck is content determination, not realization. A one-sentence length budget does not repair selection. It trades away recall (§7.2).

4. An architecture result. A two-stage pipeline (oracle content determination, then LLM surface realization) is faithful by construction. It reaches near-ceiling precision and recall at unchanged fluency, robust under audience-register adaptation, echoing pipeline-vs-end-to-end findings from neural data-to-text (Castro Ferreira et al., 2019) in a setting where the pipeline's first stage can be made provably correct (§7.3).

2 Related Work

Faithfulness in data-to-text and summarization. Hallucination and omission relative to input data are central concerns of neural NLG (Maynez et al., 2020). Evaluation compares output content to the input record or references (PARENT aligns n-grams to tables (Dhingra et al., 2019)) or uses expert error annotation (Thomson and Reiter, 2020). QA-, entailment-, and typology-based metrics score factual consistency (Wang et al., 2020; Durmus et al., 2020; Kryscinski et al., 2020; Pagnoni et al., 2021), and hallucination is surveyed broadly (Ji et al., 2023) and controlled in data-to-text (Rebuffel et al., 2022). These methods check groundedness, whether stated content is licensed by the input. Decision explanation needs a stronger notion (whether stated content is the cause of the decision), which grounding metrics cannot see. A padded explanation is fully grounded and causally wrong. Our oracle supplies the missing causal reference automatically.

Pipeline vs. end-to-end generation. Castro Ferreira et al. (2019) found that pipeline architectures with explicit intermediate representations generalize better and hallucinate less than end-to-end neural data-to-text systems. Content selection is a classic distinct stage (Barzilay and Lapata, 2005; Puduppully et al., 2019) whose difficulty grows at data-to-document scale (Wiseman et al., 2017). We push this to its limit case. When the decision-maker is executable, the content-determination stage can be computed rather than learned, converting an empirical advantage into a guarantee. Our results quantify what the end-to-end shortcut costs. It is not fluency, not grounding, but causal content selection. A related concern is that NLG explanations can overload readers by presenting too many decision features (Forrest et al., 2018).

Faithfulness of natural language explanations. Work on explanation faithfulness tests consistency between explanations and model behavior. These include counterfactual simulatability (Hase and Bansal, 2020; Chen et al., 2024; Limpijankit et al., 2025), input-reconstruction tests (Atanasova et al., 2023), and self-consistency analyses (Parcalabescu and Frank, 2024; Madsen et al., 2024). Chain-of-thought studies show stated reasoning can omit decisive factors (Turpin et al., 2023; Lanham et al., 2023). Others evaluate rationales and free-text explanations (DeYoung et al., 2020; Camburu et al.,

2018; Rajani et al., 2019; Wiegreffe and Marasović, 2021) or question attention faithfulness (Jain and Wallace, 2019; Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). All are defined against opaque models, so they measure proxies. We show empirically (§7.4) that the two standard proxies fail to track causal correctness where ground truth is available, motivating oracle testbeds for validating any cheaper metric.

Formal explanations. Minimal sufficient reasons (abductive explanations) are a staple of formal XAI for symbolic models (Shih et al., 2018; Ignatiev et al., 2019; Marques-Silva and Ignatiev, 2022) but have not been used to evaluate or steer text generation. Model-agnostic attribution (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Lundberg and Lee, 2017) lacks such guarantees, motivating interpretable-by-design models (Rudin, 2019). We use minimal sufficient reasons as both evaluation reference and content plan.

3 Task and Oracle-Grounded Evaluation

3.1 Task

The input is a structured record, a context $c \in \mathcal{X} = \prod_{i \in F} \mathcal{X}_i$ over feature set F (a tool call's properties and session state) together with the decision of an executable gate $G : \mathcal{X} \to \{\text{ALLOW}, \text{BLOCK}\}$. The output is a short text x explaining why the gate decided $G(c)$. A pair (i, c_i) is a literal of the record. An audited extraction step maps x to the cited set $\hat{C}(x) \subseteq F$ (the features x presents as reasons) plus any asserted claims contradicting c.

3.2 The oracle: computable content references

For $S \subseteq F$, let $\mathcal{X}_S(c)$ be all contexts agreeing with c on S. S is sufficient at c iff $G(c') = G(c)$ for every $c' \in \mathcal{X}_S(c)$. The subset-minimal sufficient sets $\mathrm{MSR}(c)$ are the true content plans for the explanation, the complete, irredundant reasons for the decision (Ignatiev et al., 2019). $U(c) = \bigcup \mathrm{MSR}(c)$ is the causally relevant feature set. A feature is decisive if changing it alone can flip the decision. Because GLASSGATE's context space is fully enumerable, we materialize G as a decision tensor and compute all of these exactly. Sufficiency is uniformity of a tensor slice, and enumerating $\mathrm{MSR}(c)$ takes milliseconds per context. No sampling or approximation is involved.

Figure 1 summarizes the full architecture, and Table 1 walks one real episode through it end to end.

3.3 Content-selection metrics

Fix a cited set $\hat{C}$ at context c.

Causal precision $= |\hat{C} \cap U(c)|/|\hat{C}|$ (undefined and excluded when $\hat{C} = \emptyset$, with counts reported).

Causal recall $= \max_{M \in \mathrm{MSR}(c)} |\hat{C} \cap M|/|M|$. Citing any one complete reason scores 1, so the metric is robust to MSR non-uniqueness.

Sufficiency, binary and graded, asks whether pinning exactly the cited literals forces the decision, and for what fraction of completions, the oracle-checked analogue of input-reconstruction tests (Atanasova et al., 2023).

Over-claim rate counts any asserted claim contradicting c (the classical grounding failure).

We additionally measure counterfactual simulatability (Chen et al., 2024) with a fixed reader model, a no-explanation control, and rubric-anchored fluency (1–5) blind to correctness. Precision, recall, sufficiency, and over-claim are computed by executing G. The only learned component is the extractor, audited against an independent deterministic extractor with a full sensitivity re-analysis.

These metrics treat each explanation as an unordered set of cited features. They capture which factors an explanation presents as reasons, not the causal structure it asserts among them, so an explanation that correctly presents two features as jointly responsible and one that wrongly presents them as independent causes can receive the same score. We make this reduction explicit here and examine its consequences in §7.4 and Appendix H.

3.4 Evaluation protocol

Writing $m(e)$ for a metric value on episode e and $\bar{m}$ for its mean over the n evaluated episodes, we report percentile bootstrap intervals

$$\mathrm{CI}_{95}(\bar{m}) = \left[\, q_{.025}(\bar{m}^*),\ q_{.975}(\bar{m}^*) \,\right], \qquad (1)$$

over B=2,000 seeded resamples $\bar{m}^*$ of episodes. System contrasts on the same episodes use a paired sign-flip permutation test on the mean difference $d_e = m_A(e) - m_B(e)$,

$$p = \frac{1 + \#\{\pi : |\overline{s^\pi d}| \geq |\bar{d}|\}}{1 + 10^4}, \qquad (2)$$

with random sign vectors $s^\pi \in \{-1, +1\}^n$. We report paired effect sizes $d_z = \bar{d}/s_d$ alongside p-values, and apply Holm–Bonferroni correction across the full family of 16 system contrasts. Counterfactual simulatability for explanation x is




Figure 1: The evaluation pipeline. Blue components are exact computations over the executable gate; green/yellow components involve LLMs (generation, extraction, reading); the extractor is the only learned component whose error can reach the metrics, and it is audited (Appendix G).

reader accuracy over k=3 seeded perturbations c'_j of c (Hamming distance 1–2, balanced between decision-flipping and decision-preserving),

$$\mathrm{Sim}(x) = \tfrac{1}{k} \textstyle\sum_j \mathbb{1}\big[r(x, c'_j) = G(c'_j)\big], \quad (3)$$

where r is the fixed reader, and the control replaces x with nothing. Extractor reliability is quantified as inter-extractor agreement over all (explanation, feature) units, reported as micro-F1, per-feature Cohen's κ, and Krippendorff's α (nominal, two coders). Finally, the oracle side of the evaluation is exact and cheap by construction. Materializing G costs one pass over $\mathcal{X}$, and each episode's full oracle annotation ($2^{|F|}$ slice-uniformity checks) runs in milliseconds, so the marginal cost of evaluating a new system is one LLM generation plus one extraction call per episode.

4 The GLASSGATE Testbed

GLASSGATE models an MCP-style agent gateway (Anthropic, 2024). Contexts have 10 categorical features (`tool` (12 values), `scope_level`, `target_domain`, three payload flags (`contains_pii`, `contains_credentials`, `contains_financial`), `auth_level`, `user_role`, `intent`, `prior_violations`) with the full Cartesian product valid, giving $|\mathcal{X}| = 124{,}416$. The gate is a first-match policy of eight block rules plus a default allow (Appendix B). Rules overlap deliberately, so contexts routinely contain distractors, literals matching some block rule's antecedent yet lying outside $U(c)$ that are risk-flavored, plausible, and causally irrelevant. The global block rate is 0.546. We sample 120 stratified episodes with a fixed random seed. For each of the eight block rules we draw 9 contexts in which that rule fires first, preferring contexts rich in distractor literals, and we add 24 near-miss allows (contexts one feature away from a block) and 24 plain allows, giving 120 episodes (72 blocks and 48 allows). Canonical MSR sizes span 2–6 features, and half the episodes admit multiple MSRs (statistics in Appendix A).

5 Generation Systems

All systems share one instruction ("write 2–4 sentences for the audit log explaining why this call was allowed/blocked") and differ in conditioning.

E2E End-to-end, conditioned on the record and the decision. Deployed practice.

E2E+POLICY E2E plus the verbatim policy text, testing whether unfaithful selection is an information problem.

PIPELINE A two-stage architecture that separates content determination from surface realization (Reiter and Dale, 2000; Reiter, 2007), in which the oracle performs content determination (the canonical, lexicographically smallest

Record	tool=email.send, scope_level=read, target_domain=public.web, contains_pii=yes, contains_credentials=yes, contains_financial=no, auth_level=none, user_role=analyst, intent=destructive, prior_violations=2
Gate	BLOCK (rule R1 credential-egress fires first)
Oracle	canonical MSR = {tool, target_domain, contains_credentials}; distractors = {contains_pii, auth_level, user_role, intent, prior_violations}
E2E	"BLOCKED: This email.send call was denied because it would transmit PII and embedded credentials to a public web domain without any authentication context (auth_level: none), and the requesting agent flagged intent as destructive. The requester's role (analyst) exceeds the read-only scope_level granted, indicating a privilege mismatch between the requested action and authorized permissions. Additionally, this session has 2 prio…" cited: {auth_level, contains_credentials, contains_pii, intent, prior_violations, scope_level, target_domain, user_role} ⇒ CPrec 0.25, CRec 0.67
PIPELINE	"This tool call was blocked because the 'email.send' action would transmit data containing credentials to a public.web destination. Sending credential data outbound to a public, non-internal domain via email represents an unacceptable exfiltration risk and is disallowed regardless of other context. The combination of an outbound email tool, a public web target, and the presence of credentials in the payload triggered an automat…" cited: {contains_credentials, target_domain, tool} ⇒ CPrec 1.00, CRec 1.00

Table 1: A worked episode (Sonnet outputs, abridged). The context carries five risk-flavored distractors; E2E cites nearly all of them, burying the three-literal true reason, while PIPELINE realizes exactly the oracle's content plan.

MSR extracted by counterfactual probing of G) and the LLM performs surface realization, instructed to cite exactly those factors.

Two controlled variants probe the failure and the guarantee.

E2E-CONCISE E2E under a one-sentence, ≤25-word budget. If unfaithful selection were mere verbosity, a length budget would fix it.

PIPELINE-USER, PIPELINE-EXEC PIPELINE realized for different audiences, a plain-language end-user notification (no field names, no jargon) and a ≤15-word executive summary. Does the architecture's faithfulness guarantee survive register adaptation (Gatt and Krahmer, 2018)?

6 Experimental Setup

Models. Qwen3-14B (4-bit, run locally, the on-device regime of embedded gateways), Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 5, and Claude Opus 4.8 generate under E2E, E2E+POLICY, PIPELINE. E2E-CONCISE runs on all four models and PIPELINE-USER/PIPELINE-EXEC on Haiku and Opus. The three core systems are generated and evaluated on all 120 episodes (1,440 explanations). The constrained variants (E2E-CONCISE, PIPELINE-USER, PIPELINE-EXEC) are evaluated on a deterministic stratification-preserving 64-episode subset (512 variant explanations). All texts are released.

Extraction and auditing. The primary extractor is Claude Haiku 4.5 with a constrained JSON schema (cite-as-reason judgment per feature, contradiction list, one retry, deterministic fallback). A deterministic alias-matching extractor runs on all items. Inter-extractor agreement is micro-F1 0.886, Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.761$, median per-feature $\kappa = 0.797$ (per-feature table in Appendix G), and headline results are reproduced under the deterministic extractor (Table 9).

Statistics. 95% bootstrap CIs over episodes (B=2,000), and paired sign-flip permutation tests (10^4 permutations) for system contrasts. Every reported number is produced by released scripts, and table values enter via generated macros.

7 Results

7.1 End-to-end generation fails at content selection

Table 2 and Figure 2 give the core comparison. Under E2E, causal precision is low and flat across model scale, at 0.506 (Qwen3-14B), 0.541 (Haiku), 0.534 (Sonnet), and 0.534 (Opus). Roughly half of the content every model selects is causally irrelevant, and moving from a quantized 14B model to a frontier model does not change it. The rest of the profile shows why this is specifically a content-determination failure. Recall is high (0.732–0.906), and the true reason is usually present, buried. Fluency is uniformly high (3.89–4.40). Over-claiming is rare and falls with scale (Qwen 0.067 → Opus

Model	Cond.	CPrec↑	CRec↑	Suff↑	Sim↑	Over↓	Flu
Qwen3-14B	E2E	0.506 [0.461, 0.554]	0.732 [0.685, 0.777]	0.375 [0.292, 0.458]	0.522 [0.469, 0.572]	0.067 [0.025, 0.117]	4.17
	E2E+POLICY	0.736 [0.681, 0.787]	0.737 [0.677, 0.792]	0.508 [0.417, 0.600]	0.686 [0.633, 0.736]	0.017 [0.000, 0.042]	4.10
	PIPELINE	0.951 [0.927, 0.972]	0.981 [0.963, 0.996]	0.958 [0.917, 0.992]	0.633 [0.581, 0.686]	0.092 [0.042, 0.142]	4.24
Haiku 4.5	E2E	0.541 [0.496, 0.587]	0.840 [0.799, 0.877]	0.583 [0.492, 0.667]	0.528 [0.478, 0.578]	0.075 [0.033, 0.125]	3.89
	E2E+POLICY	0.867 [0.836, 0.896]	0.942 [0.916, 0.966]	0.825 [0.750, 0.892]	0.717 [0.664, 0.767]	0.025 [0.000, 0.058]	4.25
	PIPELINE	0.906 [0.875, 0.937]	0.966 [0.948, 0.982]	0.875 [0.817, 0.933]	0.639 [0.592, 0.686]	0.067 [0.025, 0.117]	3.97
Sonnet 5	E2E	0.534 [0.493, 0.580]	0.906 [0.875, 0.935]	0.725 [0.642, 0.800]	0.594 [0.544, 0.642]	0.017 [0.000, 0.042]	4.14
	E2E+POLICY	0.775 [0.730, 0.817]	0.961 [0.942, 0.978]	0.858 [0.792, 0.917]	0.794 [0.753, 0.836]	0.025 [0.000, 0.058]	4.22
	PIPELINE	0.951 [0.927, 0.972]	0.957 [0.938, 0.975]	0.850 [0.783, 0.908]	0.672 [0.628, 0.719]	0.017 [0.000, 0.042]	4.11
Opus 4.8	E2E	0.534 [0.493, 0.577]	0.895 [0.860, 0.927]	0.725 [0.642, 0.800]	0.558 [0.508, 0.608]	0.008 [0.000, 0.025]	4.40
	E2E+POLICY	0.840 [0.798, 0.879]	0.973 [0.958, 0.986]	0.883 [0.825, 0.942]	0.764 [0.717, 0.811]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	4.22
	PIPELINE	0.991 [0.975, 1.000]	0.972 [0.954, 0.988]	0.908 [0.858, 0.958]	0.703 [0.656, 0.753]	0.008 [0.000, 0.025]	4.10

Table 2: Core systems: causal precision (CPrec), causal recall (CRec), oracle-checked sufficiency (Suff), counterfactual simulatability (Sim; no-explanation control = 0.508), over-claim rate (Over), and fluency (Flu, 1–5), with 95% bootstrap CIs. FREE = E2E, POLICY = E2E+POLICY, ORACLE = PIPELINE.




Figure 2: Content-selection quality by model and architecture (95% CIs). Light → dark: E2E → E2E+POLICY → PIPELINE.

0.008). Realization is grounded, in the classical data-to-text sense (Maynez et al., 2020). Selection is wrong. Mechanically, E2E explanations cite 6.9 of 10 record features on average and 0.846 of the available distractor literals on blocked calls (Figure 3), risk-themed content dumps. A grounding-style metric (Dhingra et al., 2019) would score these outputs well (every cited literal is true of the input), which is exactly the blind spot the causal reference closes.

Two finer cuts sharpen the diagnosis. First, the failure concentrates on the high-stakes case. On blocked calls, pooled E2E precision is 0.381, against 0.751 on allows (recall is comparable, 0.844 vs. 0.841). Part of this asymmetry is structural (allow certificates have larger relevant sets, so citation is easier to get right) but the operational reading stands. Exactly where an auditor most needs the reason (a refusal), half to two-thirds of the stated reasons are irrelevant. Second, omission is not random. Among E2E explanations whose true reason includes a given feature, the `tool` literal is omitted from the citation set 0.708 of the time (models treat the acting tool as scenery rather than cause) with `scope_level` a distant second (0.330). This matches the qualitative pattern (Appendix H). Explanations narrate risk atmosphere, not mechanism.

Providing the full policy (E2E+POLICY) helps substantially (Haiku 0.541 → 0.867, all models $p < 0.001$, paired permutation) but leaves a large gap to the pipeline, and leaves the smallest model's recall essentially unchanged (Qwen 0.732 → 0.737, n.s.). Identifying the operative rule among nine is itself a nontrivial reasoning task. All but one of the 16 system contrasts remain significant under Holm–Bonferroni correction (the exception is precisely this Qwen recall contrast), and the precision gains from E2E to PIPELINE are very large in paired effect size ($d_z = 1.5$–1.8 across models).

System	Model	CPrec	CRec	Over	Len	$\lvert\hat{C}\rvert$
E2E-CONCISE	Qwen3-14B	0.511 [0.437, 0.587]	0.599 [0.522, 0.670]	0.156 [0.078, 0.250]	24	4.8
E2E-CONCISE	Haiku 4.5	0.560 [0.498, 0.626]	0.722 [0.656, 0.783]	0.031 [0.000, 0.078]	15	5.1
E2E-CONCISE	Sonnet 5	0.563 [0.497, 0.635]	0.833 [0.776, 0.888]	0.031 [0.000, 0.078]	22	5.9
E2E-CONCISE	Opus 4.8	0.535 [0.470, 0.600]	0.829 [0.774, 0.878]	0.016 [0.000, 0.047]	37	6.2
PIPELINE-USER	Haiku 4.5	0.934 [0.894, 0.969]	0.862 [0.813, 0.906]	0.016 [0.000, 0.047]	42	2.9
PIPELINE-USER	Opus 4.8	0.924 [0.881, 0.961]	0.837 [0.794, 0.882]	0.125 [0.047, 0.203]	60	2.8
PIPELINE-EXEC	Haiku 4.5	0.935 [0.898, 0.970]	0.828 [0.772, 0.880]	0.016 [0.000, 0.047]	9	2.8
PIPELINE-EXEC	Opus 4.8	0.992 [0.980, 1.000]	0.931 [0.882, 0.966]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	15	2.8

Table 3: Constrained-generation systems (95% CIs, 64-episode subset): E2E-CONCISE across all four models; PIPELINE-USER and PIPELINE-EXEC for Haiku and Opus.




Figure 3: E2E, blocked calls: causal recall and distractor-citation rate vs. the number of distractor literals present. With ≥ 2 distractors available, models cite ~85–90% of them.

7.2 A length budget is not a content-selection policy

If padding were verbosity, brevity would cure it. E2E-CONCISE (one sentence, $\leq$25 words) shrinks outputs to a mean of 25 words and 5.5 cited features, but causal precision improves only modestly (0.511/0.560/0.563/0.535 across the four models), while causal recall drops (0.599/0.722/0.833/0.829, vs. 0.732–0.906 unconstrained). Under a budget, models do not preferentially keep causally relevant literals. They drop relevant and irrelevant content alike. Distractor citation falls, but so does coverage of the true reason, leaving precision nearly unchanged (Table 3). Content selection is not a side effect of length. It is the missing capability.

7.3 The pipeline guarantee, and what it survives

PIPELINE behaves as the architecture predicts. It reaches precision 0.906–0.991 (Opus near-perfect at 0.991) and recall 0.957–0.981, at fluency indistinguishable from E2E (3.97–4.24 vs. 3.89–4.40). The faithfulness lives in the architecture, not the model. The same models that select content at $\approx$ 0.5 precision realize provided content near-perfectly.

Register adaptation stresses the guarantee the way deployment would. Audit-log prose is not what an end user should see. Realizing the same oracle content plan as a jargon-free user notification (PIPELINE-USER) or a $\leq$15-word executive line (PIPELINE-EXEC) largely preserves it for both tested models, with precision 0.934/0.924 (user register, Haiku/Opus) and 0.935/0.992 (executive), and recall 0.862/0.837 and 0.828/0.931 (Table 3). The costs appear where theory predicts. Paraphrastic user-register realization makes cited content harder to extract reliably, and 15-word compression trades some recall. The guarantee is a property of the content plan, and realization style bends it only at the margins.

Realizer capability still matters at the low end. The 14B model under PIPELINE shows the highest over-claim rate of any core cell (0.092), and a weak realizer can embellish around a correct content plan. Faithful content determination is necessary, not sufficient, and the realizer must stay inside the plan.

7.4 Reference-free proxies do not track causal correctness

Finally, the oracle audits the proxies the field would otherwise use. Sufficiency-style reconstruction (Atanasova et al., 2023) rates E2E explanations kindly (graded sufficiency 0.805–0.914), and 27.6% of them fully force the decision while citing mostly irrelevant content. Padding pins the context, so sufficiency saturates exactly when precision collapses (Figure 4, top).

The full inter-metric correlation structure (Table 4) makes the failure mechanical. Graded sufficiency correlates at $\rho = 0.95$ with causal recall (it is, in effect, a coverage detector), while noth-




Figure 4: Per-explanation graded sufficiency (top) and simulatability (bottom) vs. causal precision under E2E, with bin means. Sufficiency saturates near 1 at every precision level (the signature of padding) while simulatability is flat around the no-explanation control; its k=3 counterfactuals quantize scores to $\{0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}, 1\}$.

	CPrec	CRec	Suff	Sim	Flu
CPrec	—				
CRec	0.30	—			
Suff	0.24	0.95	—		
Sim	0.20	-0.04	-0.07	—	
Flu	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.08	—

Table 4: Spearman correlations among per-explanation quality signals (E2E, all models pooled). Sufficiency tracks recall ($\rho = 0.95$), not precision; fluency tracks nothing: the padded-but-fluent failure mode is invisible to every proxy.

ing correlates appreciably with causal precision, the dimension padding destroys. Counterfactual simulatability is worse still, only weakly related to causal precision per explanation ($\rho = 0.20$) and barely above the no-explanation control (0.508) for E2E. It even prefers E2E+POLICY to PIPELINE (Appendix Figure 6), rewarding explanations that quote generalizable policy structure over ones stating the true reason for the decision at hand.

Evaluation protocols for explanation generation validated only against such proxies inherit these blind spots. Oracle testbeds like GLASSGATE can serve as validation targets for cheaper metrics before they are trusted where no ground truth exists.

Qualitative analysis. A precision-stratified author-coded sample of 28 E2E explanations (protocol in Appendix H) shows three patterns behind the numbers, namely distractor padding (24/28), confabulated mechanism (invented thresholds and overrides the gate does not contain, 11/28), and prior substitution on allowed calls (9/11 allows). Instead of the true certificate ("no block rule matched"), models narrate risk-weighing stories from their own security intuitions. The strongest model twice refused to explain an allow its own prior disagreed with. Representative cases in Table 11.

8 Discussion

For NLG practice. Decision-explanation generation is mostly deployed end-to-end. Where the decision-maker is executable (the common case for policy gateways) the plan-then-realize split is not nostalgia but a guarantee. Content determination by counterfactual probing costs milliseconds, and faithfulness becomes a property of the architecture, not a hope about model behavior (Castro Ferreira et al., 2019; Reiter and Dale, 2000). The register study shows the plan-then-realize split carries the guarantee across audiences. The tempting middle ground (pasting the policy into the prompt) improves selection but leaves a gap, costs small-model recall, and looks better than the pipeline under the simulatability proxy while being causally worse, a trade-off our metrics make visible.

For NLG evaluation. The testbed inverts the economics of faithfulness evaluation. There are no references, no annotation, and no judges, just a program, exact and free at any scale. In the spirit of Thomson and Reiter (2020), it is a controlled gold standard against which faster, noisier metrics and human protocols can be validated where ground truth is absent.

Beyond the enumerable gate. Two properties should not be conflated. The generation recipe requires only that the decision-maker be executable. Minimal sufficient reasons for rule-based, decision-tree, and other symbolic policies are computable at industrial scale by logic-based abduction (Ignatiev et al., 2019; Marques-Silva and Ignatiev, 2022), without enumeration, so real gateway policies over thousands of tools are in range. Full enumerability is a property of the testbed, making every evaluation quantity exact. It is what makes GLASSGATE

a gold standard, not what limits the method. The open frontier is neural decision-makers, where no exact content reference exists. There, our results are a calibration warning. The proxies one would fall back on (sufficiency, simulatability) are exactly those shown here to miss the dominant failure mode. The content-determination diagnosis is not specific to gates. Any data-to-text setting with a computable notion of "what mattered" (aggregable statistics, triggered thresholds, matched rules) admits the same plan-then-realize construction.

9 Conclusion

We framed policy-decision explanation as data-to-text with a computable content reference, measured where generation fails (content determination, at every model scale, unrepaired by length budgets), showed what restores it (oracle content planning with LLM realization, robust across audience registers, modulo weak-realizer leakage), and demonstrated that standard reference-free proxies cannot see the failure. Benchmark, oracle, and evaluation suite are released.

Limitations

Synthetic gate. The gate is synthetic and first-match. Real gateway policies are messier (exceptions, temporal state, human overrides), and our evaluated space is enumerable by design. As argued in §8, the pipeline recipe extends to non-enumerable symbolic policies via logic-based abduction, and only the exactness of evaluation depends on enumerability, but we do not empirically demonstrate either extension here, and neural decision-makers admit no exact content reference at all. Transfer of the content-selection diagnosis to those settings is argued (§7.4), not measured.

MSR non-uniqueness. Recall maximizes over MSRs and precision uses their union. Other aggregations are defensible, and per-episode MSR sets are released for recomputation.

Set-based metrics. Causal precision and recall score the set of cited features and do not capture the causal structure an explanation asserts, for instance whether two features are presented as jointly or as independently responsible. Extending the metrics to relational structure is future work.

Extractor error. Mapping free text to cited content is itself an NLP step. We audit it against an independent deterministic extractor, report agreement, and reproduce conclusions under both. Residual correlated error cannot be fully excluded and grows in jargon-free registers.

No human study. Evaluation is automatic plus a structured author-conducted qualitative analysis. Whether causally imprecise explanations mislead human readers is future work this testbed is designed to support.

Ethics Statement

GLASSGATE is fully synthetic, with no real user data, credentials, or organizational policies. It models a defensive setting (explaining guardrail decisions) and provides no attack capability. Faithful explanations can reveal policy structure to adversaries probing a gateway. Deployments may deliberately coarsen explanations. Our framework measures faithfulness so that trade-off can be made explicitly.

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A Benchmark Statistics

Table 5 and Figure 5 summarize the 120 episodes.

Context space $\lvert\mathcal{X}\rvert$	124,416
Global block rate of G	0.546
Episodes (blocks / near-miss / plain allows)	120 (72 / 24 / 24)
Evaluation subset (stratification-preserving)	64 episodes
Canonical MSR size (min / median / max)	2 / 3 / 6
Episodes with multiple MSRs	60/120
Distractor-rich blocks (≥ 2 distractors)	68/72

Table 5: Benchmark statistics.

B Full Policy Text

```
Gateway policy (rules are checked in order; the
  first matching rule decides):
R1 credential-egress: BLOCK if the payload contains
  credentials, the target domain is public.web or
  unknown.xyz, and the tool is an outbound channel
  (email.send, http.post, or files.write).
R2 payments-elevation: BLOCK if the tool is
  payments.transfer and the session auth_level is
  not elevated.
R3 destructive-role: BLOCK if the declared intent
  is destructive, the user_role is not admin, and
  the tool can modify or delete data (files.delete,
  files.write, or db.write).
R4 unauthenticated-write: BLOCK if the session
  auth_level is none and the requested scope_level
  is write or admin.
R5 pii-external-share: BLOCK if the payload
  contains PII, the declared intent is
  external_share, and the target domain is not
  internal.corp.
R6 repeat-offender-admin: BLOCK if the session has
  2 prior policy violations and the requested
  scope_level is admin.
R7 intern-financial-export: BLOCK if the user_role
  is intern, the declared intent is bulk_export,
  and the payload contains financial data.
R8 unknown-domain-write: BLOCK if the target domain
  is unknown.xyz and the requested scope_level is
  write or admin.
R9 default: ALLOW if no earlier rule matched.
```

C Generation Prompts

One full generation prompt per core system for the same blocked episode. The constrained-variant instructions (E2E-CONCISE, PIPELINE-USER, PIPELINE-EXEC) differ only in the final task sentence, reproduced in §5.

Free condition.

```
You write audit-log explanations for an AI agent
  security gateway. The gateway inspects each tool
  call an AI agent attempts and either allows or
  blocks it.

Tool-call context:
tool: email.send
scope_level: read
target_domain: public.web
contains_pii: yes
contains_credentials: yes
contains_financial: no
auth_level: none
user_role: analyst
intent: destructive
prior_violations: 2

Gateway decision: BLOCKED

Write 2-4 sentences for the audit log explaining
  why this tool call was blocked. Write only the
  explanation, nothing else.
```

Policy condition.

```
You write audit-log explanations for an AI agent
  security gateway. The gateway inspects each tool
  call an AI agent attempts and either allows or
  blocks it.

Tool-call context:
tool: email.send
scope_level: read
target_domain: public.web
contains_pii: yes
contains_credentials: yes
contains_financial: no
auth_level: none
user_role: analyst
intent: destructive
prior_violations: 2

Gateway decision: BLOCKED

Gateway policy (rules are checked in order; the
  first matching rule decides):
R1 credential-egress: BLOCK if the payload contains
  credentials, the target domain is public.web or
  unknown.xyz, and the tool is an outbound channel
  (email.send, http.post, or files.write).
R2 payments-elevation: BLOCK if the tool is
  payments.transfer and the session auth_level is
  not elevated.
R3 destructive-role: BLOCK if the declared intent
  is destructive, the user_role is not admin, and
  the tool can modify or delete data (files.delete,
  files.write, or db.write).
R4 unauthenticated-write: BLOCK if the session
  auth_level is none and the requested scope_level
  is write or admin.
R5 pii-external-share: BLOCK if the payload
  contains PII, the declared intent is
  external_share, and the target domain is not
  internal.corp.
R6 repeat-offender-admin: BLOCK if the session has
  2 prior policy violations and the requested
  scope_level is admin.
R7 intern-financial-export: BLOCK if the user_role
  is intern, the declared intent is bulk_export,
  and the payload contains financial data.
```




Figure 5: Distributions over the 120 episodes: canonical-MSR size, number of distinct MSRs, distractor counts on blocks.

```
R8 unknown-domain-write: BLOCK if the target domain
  is unknown.xyz and the requested scope_level is
  write or admin.
R9 default: ALLOW if no earlier rule matched.

Write 2-4 sentences for the audit log explaining
  why this tool call was blocked. Write only the
  explanation, nothing else.
```

Oracle condition.

```
You write audit-log explanations for an AI agent
  security gateway. The gateway inspects each tool
  call an AI agent attempts and either allows or
  blocks it.

Tool-call context:
tool: email.send
scope_level: read
target_domain: public.web
contains_pii: yes
contains_credentials: yes
contains_financial: no
auth_level: none
user_role: analyst
intent: destructive
prior_violations: 2

Gateway decision: BLOCKED

The decision was determined exactly by the
  following factor(s) of the context: tool =
  email.send, target_domain = public.web,
  contains_credentials = yes. Cite exactly these
  factors as the reason for the decision; do not
  present any other contextual factor as a reason.

Write 2-4 sentences for the audit log explaining
  why this tool call was blocked. Write only the
  explanation, nothing else.
```

D Judge Prompts

The complete prompts for every judge role, verbatim from the released code (placeholders in angle brackets).

Citation extraction (judge: Haiku 4.5).

```
You are annotating an audit-log explanation
  produced by an AI security gateway.

The true tool-call context was:
<record>

The gateway decision was: <decision>

The explanation to annotate:
"""<explanation>"""

The context has exactly these 10 features:
<the 10 feature names>

Task:
1. "cited": list every feature that the explanation
  presents as a REASON contributing to the
  decision. Count a feature if the explanation
  refers to it or its value (any paraphrase) as
  part of why the call was allowed/blocked. Do NOT
  count a feature that is merely restated without
  being part of the justification.
2. "contradicted": list every claim in the
  explanation about the context that CONTRADICTS
  the true context above (wrong value, or asserts a
  fact about a feature that is false). Use objects
  {{"feature": <name>, "claimed": <what the
  explanation asserts>}}.

Return ONLY a JSON object like:
{{"cited": ["feature_name", ...], "contradicted":
  [{{"feature": "feature_name", "claimed": "..."}},
  ...]}}
```

Counterfactual-simulatability reader.

```
An AI agent security gateway decides whether to
  allow or block each tool call it sees, following
  a fixed internal policy. You will see an
  audit-log explanation the gateway produced for
  one of its decisions, then 3 NEW tool-call
  contexts.

Audit-log explanation of a previous decision:
"""<explanation>"""

Predict the gateway's decision for each new context.

<3 perturbed records>

Answer with ONLY a JSON list of 3 strings, each
  "ALLOW" or "BLOCK", in order.
```

No-explanation control.

```
An AI agent security gateway decides whether to
  allow or block each tool call it sees, following
  a fixed internal policy. You will see 3 tool-call
  contexts.

Predict the gateway's decision for each context.

<3 perturbed records>

Answer with ONLY a JSON list of 3 strings, each
  "ALLOW" or "BLOCK", in order.
```

Fluency rating.

```
Rate the fluency of the following audit-log
  explanation on a 1-5 scale.
Judge ONLY language quality (grammar, clarity,
  coherence), NOT whether the
content is correct.

5 = flawless, natural professional prose
4 = minor awkwardness, fully understandable
3 = noticeably awkward or repetitive but
  understandable
2 = hard to follow in places
1 = broken or barely coherent

Explanation:
"""<explanation>"""

Answer with ONLY the integer rating.
```

E Example Outputs Across Systems

All outputs below are verbatim Opus generations for the same blocked episode (ep011, rule R2: `payments.transfer` without elevated auth).

E2E.

```
The `payments.transfer` call was blocked because it
  requested admin-level scope with an
  authentication level of "none," failing the
  baseline authorization requirement for any
  privileged financial operation. The request
  combined multiple high-risk signals: it carried
  PII, credentials, and financial data
  simultaneously, targeted an external domain
  (partner.example), and was initiated under a
  bulk-export intent by an intern-role user—an
  escalation pattern inconsistent with that role's
  expected privileges. The absence of
  authentication alone is disqualifying, but the
  concentration of sensitive data types and the
  external transfer destination compound the
  exfiltration risk. The requesting identity also
  has a prior violation on record, further
  supporting denial under the gateway's
  cumulative-risk policy.
```

E2E+Policy.

```
This tool call was blocked by rule R2
  (payments-elevation), the first rule in the
  policy order to match. The gateway evaluated a
  `payments.transfer` request whose session
  `auth_level` was `none` rather than elevated, and
  the policy prohibits any payments transfer that
  is not backed by an elevated authentication
  session. Because rules are checked in order and
  the first match decides, R2 alone determined the
  outcome, so the call was denied before later
  rules were evaluated.

Note that other conditions in this request (intern
  role performing a bulk export of financial data,
  PII and credentials in the payload, a prior
  violation) would also warrant scrutiny, but the
  transfer was stopped first and foremost by the
  missing elevated authorization for a payments
  operation.
```

Pipeline.

```
This tool call was blocked because it invoked
  `payments.transfer` while the request carried an
  `auth_level` of `none`. Executing a
  `payments.transfer` operation requires an
  authenticated caller, and the absence of any
  authentication makes the call ineligible to
  proceed. On the basis of these two factors—the
  `payments.transfer` tool combined with an
  authentication level of none—the gateway denied
  the request.
```

E2E-Concise.

```
Blocked because an unauthenticated intern attempted
  an admin-scope bulk export of PII, credentials,
  and financial data to an external domain despite
  a prior violation.
```

Pipeline-User.

```
Your request to move money couldn't be completed
  because that kind of action requires you to be
  signed in with verified permissions, and right
  now you aren't signed in. To keep financial
  transactions safe, we can't process a money
  transfer without confirming your identity first.
  Please sign in and try again.
```

Pipeline-Exec.

```
Blocked: payments.transfer invoked with
  auth_level=none — unauthenticated access to a
  payment operation.
```

F Extended Results and Ablation Detail

Table 6 gives the full per-cell results, and Figure 7 plots over-claim rates by model.

Table 7 breaks E2E results down by fired block rule, pooled over models. Low precision and high distractor citation hold for every rule. No single policy rule drives the headline numbers. Table 8 gives the complete paired-permutation significance tests behind the system contrasts.

Fired rule	n	CPrec	CRec	DistrCite
R1	36	0.454	0.801	0.899
R2	36	0.368	0.824	0.816
R3	36	0.467	0.824	0.910
R4	36	0.330	0.806	0.850
R5	36	0.416	0.889	0.873
R6	36	0.311	0.847	0.793
R7	36	0.441	1.000	0.754
R8	36	0.262	0.764	0.889

Table 7: E2E by fired rule (pooled over models): causal precision, recall, and distractor-citation rate.

Model	Cond.	Strict CPrec	Graded Suff	DistrCite	Len (words)	$\lvert\hat{C}\rvert$=0
Qwen3-14B	FREE	0.194 [0.161, 0.226]	0.805 [0.765, 0.842]	0.757 [0.698, 0.814]	56	0
	POLICY	0.426 [0.357, 0.495]	0.820 [0.779, 0.859]	0.374 [0.305, 0.450]	48	0
	ORACLE	0.579 [0.500, 0.655]	0.989 [0.977, 0.998]	0.049 [0.025, 0.078]	42	0
Haiku 4.5	FREE	0.222 [0.188, 0.256]	0.875 [0.839, 0.907]	0.770 [0.705, 0.830]	65	0
	POLICY	0.509 [0.435, 0.583]	0.956 [0.934, 0.975]	0.244 [0.179, 0.311]	63	0
	ORACLE	0.528 [0.456, 0.601]	0.983 [0.973, 0.991]	0.069 [0.041, 0.101]	56	0
Sonnet 5	FREE	0.217 [0.186, 0.247]	0.914 [0.882, 0.944]	0.856 [0.800, 0.904]	98	0
	POLICY	0.429 [0.363, 0.494]	0.962 [0.943, 0.979]	0.381 [0.313, 0.453]	94	0
	ORACLE	0.574 [0.499, 0.650]	0.980 [0.970, 0.989]	0.028 [0.012, 0.047]	64	0
Opus 4.8	FREE	0.222 [0.191, 0.255]	0.880 [0.841, 0.919]	0.847 [0.792, 0.896]	132	1
	POLICY	0.471 [0.397, 0.540]	0.977 [0.962, 0.990]	0.279 [0.210, 0.352]	88	0
	ORACLE	0.605 [0.525, 0.679]	0.980 [0.961, 0.992]	0.014 [0.000, 0.038]	74	0

Table 6: Extended per-cell results (95% CIs, $n = 120$ episodes per core cell): strict causal precision, graded sufficiency, distractor-citation rate, length, empty-citation counts.




Figure 6: Simulatability by model and architecture with the no-explanation control: the proxy prefers E2E+POLICY to PIPELINE, inverting the causal-precision ordering.




Figure 7: Over-claim rates (truncated axis): rare everywhere, decreasing with capability.

	CPrec		CRec	
Model	vs E2E+POLICY	vs PIPELINE	vs E2E+POLICY	vs PIPELINE
Qwen	<.001	<.001	0.879	<.001
Haiku	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
Sonnet	<.001	<.001	<.001	0.005
Opus	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

Table 8: Paired sign-flip permutation tests (10^4 permutations): E2E vs. E2E+POLICY and E2E vs. PIPELINE, per model and metric.

	CPrec			CRec		
Model	E2E	E2E+POLICY	PIPELINE	E2E	E2E+POLICY	PIPELINE
Qwen3-14B	0.492	0.662	0.931	0.749	0.689	0.898
Haiku 4.5	0.508	0.736	0.777	0.853	0.927	0.976
Sonnet 5	0.515	0.567	0.863	0.957	0.945	0.962
Opus 4.8	0.510	0.640	0.876	0.947	0.965	0.979

Table 9: Headline results reproduced under the deterministic alias-matching extractor. Causal precision and recall for the three core systems, with the E2E-vs-Pipeline gaps and the overall pattern unchanged.

G Extractor Agreement

Table 10 reports per-feature agreement.

Feature	κ
tool	0.452
scope_level	0.661
target_domain	0.865
contains_pii	0.867
contains_credentials	0.760
contains_financial	0.858
auth_level	0.728
user_role	0.728
intent	0.797
prior_violations	0.854

Table 10: Per-feature extractor agreement (Cohen's κ).

H Qualitative Coding Protocol

The sample was drawn by stratifying E2E explanations into causal-precision terciles crossed with decision (block/allow), sampling up to 5 per stratum with a fixed seed (28 items). Each item was read against the episode's oracle annotations (canonical MSR, all MSRs, decisive set, distractor set) and assigned any of five non-exclusive codes. The codes are distractor padding (cites ≥ 2 causally irrelevant risk literals), confabulated mechanism (asserts policy machinery absent from the gate), prior sub-

Oracle	FREE explanation (abridged)	Diagnosis
BLOCK by R1. MSR: {tool=email.send, domain=public.web, credentials=yes}	"…denied because it would transmit PII and embedded credentials to a public web domain without any authentication context…the requesting agent flagged intent as destructive. The requester's role (analyst) exceeds the read-only scope_level granted…"	*Distractor padding*: cites 8/10 features; PII, auth, intent, role, and violations are all causally irrelevant here (CPrec 0.25). The three true literals appear, diluted (CRec 0.67).
ALLOW (no rule matched; certificate incl. tool=email.read)	"…The destructive intent flag was overridden by confirmation that this action aligns with approved analytical workflows requiring access to PII…"	*Confabulated mechanism*: the gate has no override, no workflow registry, no confirmation step. The stated reason is fiction; the decision is real.
BLOCK by R6. MSR: {scope=admin, prior_violations=2}	"…blocked due to embedded credentials in a bulk export request from a user with two prior violations. The combination of elevated-scope data access…credential exposure risk, and bulk_export intent on a public domain exceeded acceptable risk thresholds…"	*Sufficient yet imprecise* (the divergence case): the cited set forces the decision (Suff 1) and covers the MSR (CRec 1.0), but 6 of the 8 cited factors are irrelevant (CPrec 0.25). Sufficiency reads as faithful; the oracle says otherwise.

Table 11: Representative E2E content-selection failures against the oracle's ground truth (texts abridged).

stitution (justifies from generic security intuitions rather than the gate's certificate), omission (causal recall < 1), and factual over-claim (asserts a value contradicting c). The respective counts are 24, 11, 9-of-11-allows, 16, and 0 of 28. The coded sample ships with the released data.

I Reproducibility Details

Models used are `claude-haiku-4-5`, `claude-sonnet-5`, and `claude-opus-4-8` (API, default decoding), and `qwen3:14b` 4-bit GGUF via local ollama (temperature 0.2, fixed seed, thinking disabled), on one Apple-silicon workstation. The judge is `claude-haiku-4-5`, fixed across all compared cells (extraction, reading, fluency). Every LLM call is content-addressed-cached (SHA-256 of model id + prompt). Dataset sampling, counterfactuals, bootstrap (B=2,000), and permutation tests (10^4) are seeded, and re-running the analysis reproduces all outputs byte-identically. Table values enter the paper via generated macros.